Skinner was no doubt nurturing the "sour grapes" residue from being attacked by Chomsky (Lakoff being eager to join the Chomsky bandwagon). However, what Skinner's behaviorism did attempt to do was to exorcise "the ghost in the machine" - the legacy of Descartes cogito. "Embodiment" merely resurrects that ghost whether or not it employs Darwin for the required "incantations". Reductionism of "mind" to "brain" does not lay the ghost because what "brain" is is defined by "mind" !
Alternative views, such as those of the phenomenologists take into account that "observation of observation" or "thinking about thinking" are subject to the same infinite regress as found in theological "creationism". This problem has been noted by biologists such as Maturana and before him Piaget, who predates Chomsky in his interest in "cognition". Piaget clearly pointed out that "logic" (as employed in empirical science) was a productof the development of human cognition and could not of itself be used in an explanation of cognition. In other words such "science" applied to "cognition" was equivalent to jello juggling with jello.
The situation was aptly summed up by Capra (in the Web of Life)when he describes "normal science" as an activity designed to "predict and control". The implication is that this is fine where "the observer" is "outside" the focus, but totally inappropriate where "the observer" becomes the object of focus. Capra reports that Maturana deflates "cognition" by moving it from its anthropocentric position concerning "language and thought" to being synonymous with "the general life process" for all life. But such a process cannot be described as proceeding in hypothetico-deductive terms like the "reasoning" of a mini-scientist. Such activity is reserved for the "observer realm" of humans chauvinistically attempting to control their world.
In short, what we call "science" is "anthropocentric reasoning" by another name.
Last edited by eccles; 08/14/09 11:39 PM.
