Surely, what generates the term "paradoxical" is the inclusion of the observer in quantum events. This immediately deconstructs "objectivity" and consequently notions of an "external reality" (re Planck's problem with "real particles"). The fact that so called "paradoxes" occur in our conceptualization of different models (going right back to wave-particle duality), could simply be a function of our tendency to prefer the dualistic naive realism of everyday life.
Scientists like Feynman refused to be drawn on the ontological implications of their models, such as his own "negative time" vectors. He called philosophers "tourists" who mused on the pragmatic working procedures of the occupants of a strange territory.
Those such as your absent Dr Kanda who witter about "inconsistency" and "nonsense" would do well to contemplate the words of Niels Bohr when he wrote " the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth". Tell Kanda to read up on "non-binary logic", or Piaget's attempts to account for "ordinary logic" as part of the biological developmental process. Note that biological considerations underscore Heisenberg's point that we never see "the world" directly, only the results of our interaction with "it". Thus the agreed "itness" is relative to what we understand as our common physiologies and common needs, and has no independent status.
Polkinghorne is well aware of these objections despite what he writes about particle physics. His chief argument for "belief" is with the origins of "morality" and here he comes head to head with Dawkins' "altruism gene" explanation.
